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Stephen A. Wandner and Christopher J. O’Leary 
Te COVID-19 virus is likely to 
cause major disruptions in U.S. labor 
markets for at least 18 months—until 
a vaccine is developed and widely 
administered. Any program to help 
afected workers and stimulate the U.S. 
economy should be carefully targeted 
to workers who are most in need of 
income support and most likely to 
quickly spend these funds in the local 
economy. 
Four groups of workers will most 
likely sufer severe problems during the 
COVID-19 crisis: 
• Sick individuals whose jobs do 
not provide sick leave or sufcient 
sick leave. 
• Unemployed workers who are 
covered by unemployment 
insurance (UI) but are deemed 
ineligible because they do not 
satisfy the requirements for being 
able to, being available for, and 
actively seeking work, among 
other eligibility requirements. 
• Unemployed workers who receive 
UI benefts but have exhausted 
their regular UI benefts. 
• Workers not covered by the UI 
program, including the self-
employed, contract employees, 
and, more generally, “gig workers.” 
Tese groups may all sufer earnings 
losses because of illness, public health 
requirements for social distancing 
from coworkers or customers during 
the crisis, and declines in economic 
demand for the products and services 
they provide. Tey may lose labor 
income, be ineligible for UI, or 
exhaust their benefts. Unless they 
have substantial savings, they will be 
unable to pay for basic needs—food, 
rent, medical care, car payments—for 
themselves and their families. Teir 
decreased spending will also harm 
their local economies. 
Proposal 
We propose changes to UI 
programs to provide income to covered 
unemployed workers, to workers still 
technically employed but without sick 
leave, and to those unemployed but 
not covered by UI. Specifcally, two 
packages of UI initiatives should be 
undertaken, with each limited to an 
18-month time frame. 
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance 
Program Refnements 
• Access to benefts: States should 
simplify the UI application 
process and provide telephone 
support to UI applicants who 
have difculty applying for 
benefts. 
• Able and available: Workers 
sufering from COVID-19 or in 
a required recovery quarantine 
should have the “able and 
available” work requirements to 
receive UI waived. 
• Actively seeking work: 
Unemployed workers from jobs 
that do not permit sufcient 
social distancing from coworkers 
and customers should have UI’s 
work search requirements lifed. 
Workers allowed to telecommute 
must continue to work. 
• Beneft standards: All states 
should be required to ofer 
benefts for a potential duration 
of at least 26 weeks, and the 
maximum weekly beneft amount 
should be two-thirds of the 
average weekly wage among UI-
covered workers in that state. 
• Administration: Te federal 
government should substantially 
increase grants to states to 
pay for the administration 
of state UI programs, as well 
as a new COVID-19 Special 
Unemployment Assistance 
program (see below). 
• Temporary emergency 
compensation: A temporary 
emergency compensation 
program extending the duration 
of benefts for 26 weeks should 
be made available to all UI 
recipients, in all states, regardless 
of the unemployment rate. It 
should be enacted by Congress 
and paid for from federal general 
revenue. 
• Permanent extended benefts: 
Extended benefts should be 
federalized and paid from 
federal general revenue. Tis 
would provide up to 13 weeks of 
additional UI benefts when the 
state total unemployment rate is 




During the severe 1974–1975 
recession, Congress enacted a Special 
Unemployment Assistance (SUA) 
program that paid benefts to workers 
not covered by the regular UI program. 
Te program was temporary and 
paid with federal general revenue. 
A similar temporary program could 
be created to pay unemployment 
assistance to workers who become sick 
from COVID-19 or have been laid of 
because they were employed in jobs 
that prevent social distancing and 
either 1) don’t have or have exhausted 
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unemployed and work in uncovered 
employment. SUA benefts would 
• be payable to self-employed, 
contract, and gig economy 
workers; 
• be payable for up to 52 weeks; 
• be paid using state beneft 
formulas but with crisis 
enhancements to amounts and 
durations listed above; 
• determine monetary eligibility 
by payroll or tax fling records; 
• waive “able, available, and 
actively seeking work” 
requirements as described 
above; 
• ensure beneft access by having 
state UI staf assist with the SUA 
application, whether this be a 
new process or adapted from 
the Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance program. 
Te temporary UI program 
refnements and COVID-19 SUA 
program would together provide 
income support to the great majority 
of workers adversely afected by the 
COVID-19 economic shock. State 
UI programs across the country 
are uniquely suited to enroll new 
participants in income transfer 
payment programs, process weekly 
or biweekly cash payments, and 
rapidly establish programs in times 
of emergencies. State UI agencies 
have experience with Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance, the 9/11 
airline unemployment assistance 
program, and temporary emergency 
compensation programs during 
recessions. 
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute. 




Assistance Would Help Gig,
Contract, Self-Employed
Workers Afected by COVID-19 
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Many, perhaps most, workers who 
have lost their jobs as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic will be eligible 
to receive regular state unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefts for up to 26 
weeks. But many other job losers who 
have a strong attachment to the labor 
force and depend on their earnings— 
self-employed workers, contract 
workers, gig workers, and others—are 
ineligible for UI because they have not 
been on the payroll of an employer who 
has paid UI taxes on their earnings. 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance 
(DUA) would make these self-
employed workers, contract workers, 
and gig workers eligible to receive UI 
benefts. It is almost certainly the most 
efective fscal policy tool available to 
the federal government to quickly blunt 
the economic damage resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
DUA is normally paid to workers 
who lose their jobs, but do not qualify 
for regular UI benefts, following 
natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
foods, tornadoes, and geological 
disasters like earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions. Te program is initiated by 
a presidential disaster declaration and 
administered by the state UI agencies, 
which in turn are overseen by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
DUA requires no new congressional 
legislation—it is authorized by 
the Staford Act of 1988—and the 
administrative structure needed to 
make it run already exists. Because 
DUA is funded by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, it 
side-steps the eligibility problem faced 
by self-employed workers under the 
regular state UI program. 
Te advantage of DUA over other 
modifcations to UI being considered, 
such as extended benefts, is that it 
assists workers who would otherwise 
not receive benefts, and it does so 
quickly—typically within two to three 
weeks of job loss. As a result, it is 
targeted to individuals whose work 
and incomes have been interrupted 
and who will likely require income for 
basics such as rent and utilities, car 
payments, and groceries. 
In short, DUA would target federal 
fnancial assistance to a large group 
of workers whose work and pay have 
ended as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic, but who are ineligible for 
UI benefts because of their self-
employment status. Te legislative 
authority exists, and the apparatus to 
run the program is ready to go. Only 
a presidential disaster declaration 
is needed to start what could now 
be the most benefcial single fscal 
policy action available to the federal 
government. 
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